Kinship, ethnicity and religion in post-Communist societies by Yemelianova, Galina M.
www.ssoar.info
Kinship, ethnicity and religion in post-Communist
societies
Yemelianova, Galina M.
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Yemelianova, G. M. (2005). Kinship, ethnicity and religion in post-Communist societies. Ethnicities, 5(1), 51-82. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1468796805049926
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-230106
Kinship, ethnicity and religion in
post-Communist societies
Russia’s autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkariya
GALINA M. YEMELIANOVA
University of Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT Among the consequences of perestroika and the subsequent break-
up of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been the rise of ethnic nationalism. In the non-
Russian parts of the former USSR this process has been accompanied by the
reactivation of clan and other primordial social networks which under Soviet
Communism had been in abeyance. This article, based on extensive field research
material, examines political and social transformation in post-Communist
Kabardino-Balkariya, a Russian Muslim autonomy in the North Caucasus. In
particular, it analyses the nature of the nation-building policies of the ruling regime,
and its relationship with the clan system. It is also concerned with Islamic revival
and Islamic radicalism in the region and their correlation with the Islam-related
republican and wider federal policies. The article reveals some grey areas in the
current academic debate on ethnicity and nationalism and injects more conceptual
syncretism into the study of post-Communist societies.
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INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of the Communist Party hierarchy and Soviet insti-
tutions, which for decades held the Soviet Union together as a multiethnic
society, has caused a fundamental social and political change all over the
former Soviet space. In Russia’s Muslim regions1 it has involved an
ethnonationalist and Islamic resurgence and the resurfacing and reactiva-
tion of archaic institutions which hitherto were either frozen, or disguised
by Soviet Communism. In the new sociopolitical setup the local ruling elites
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have embarked upon an uneasy process of nation and state building. Much
of the existing research into this process in post-Communist societies tends
to apply the institutionalist (or neoinstitutionalist) and instrumentalist
theoretical framework and therefore deals primarily with its institutional
side – political elites, political systems, government, non-governmental and
opposition organizations, as well as local administration. Of comparative
value to the present study are findings by Rogers Brubaker, Tomila
Lankina, Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev, and James Hughes and
Gwendolyn Sasse. In particular, Brubaker offers a wider theoretical
perspective on post-Communist nation-building by analysing it in terms of
the relations between the nationalisms of national minorities, newly insti-
tutionalizing states and the external national ‘homeland’ (Brubaker,
1996: 8). Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev apply a consociational
approach to the study of central political institutions in Russia’s Muslim
autonomy of Dagestan, which they perceive as an example of ‘third wave
plural societies’ (Ware and Kisriev, 2001: 129). Lankina applies an
institutionalist approach to the analysis of the organized non-governmental
actors – the social/nationalist movements in two other Russian Muslim
autonomies, Bashkortostan and Adygheya (Lankina, 2002: 1038). By
comparison, Hughes and Sasse, who are concerned with the political
reshaping of the post-Soviet Russian Federation, argue in favour of
combining institutionalist and behaviouralist approaches, due to the greater
role of the personal factor in Russian politics (Hughes and Sasse, 2001:
25–6).
These studies on the subject, although contributing a great deal to a
better understanding of post-Communist Muslim societies in transition,
neglect some other key dimensions of this transition, in particular the role
of informal non-institutional social networks. By contrast, this article, which
is based on extensive data drawn from field research, adopts a synthetic
conceptual approach which allows us to tackle the subject in all its
complexity. This approach is rooted in a constructivist understanding of the
relationship between ethnic identity, political power and nation-state
formation. It is instrumentalist in exploring the way in which ethnic and
confessional belonging is currently employed in competition for scarce
resources, not least political power. It is also primordialist in dealing with
the way in which primordialism is employed within elite narratives. In
particular, this approach allows us to reveal the mechanism by which the
ruling elite mobilizes archaic, primordial, clan- and region-based networks
for the cementing and perpetuating of its power. The empirical focus of this
article is Russia’s Muslim autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkariya.2
The article consists of an introduction, three sections and a conclusion: the
introduction outlines the applied theoretical framework and research
approach; the first section offers historical and ethnocultural insights into
the present situation; the second examines the post-Communist nationalist
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and religious resurgence; the third analyses the present ruling regime in
Kabardino-Balkariya, paying special attention to its relationship with the
clan system; and the conclusion evaluates the theoretical limitations of
existing post-Communist society studies and suggests the implications of
these research findings for the understanding of political and societal
change there.3
ETHNO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Kabardino-Balkariya is a relatively small republic, situated in the moun-
tains of the north-western Caucasus. It has a multiethnic population with
Kabardinians, Balkars and Russians being the largest ethnic groups.
Historically, the republic’s social and ethnocultural make-up was shaped by
both indigenous and external cultures, including those of the Roman and
Byzantine empires, the Arab Caliphate, the Khazar Kaghanat, the Mongol
and Ottoman empires, the Crimean Khanate and the Russian/Soviet
empire. In the past Kabarda, largely populated by the Kabardinians (an
Adygh people),4 and Balkariya, the land of Balkars (a Turkic people),
existed separately. In the Middle Ages both presented a conglomerate of
princedoms, ruled by feudal rulers – the knyazes – who owned land and
serfs. The Kabardinians had a relatively sophisticated social hierarchy and
statehood tradition. By contrast, the Balkars maintained a strong reliance
on the principles of patriarchal democracy. The authority of the Balkar
feudal owners was superseded by that of the supreme tere (an elected
council of elders). From the seventeenth century, most Kabardinians
professed Sunni Islam of Hanafi madhhab (a juridical school); the Balkars
adopted Islam of the same madhhab in the nineteenth century. Neverthe-
less, their Islamicization was not as profound as that of various peoples of
the north-eastern Caucasus (Emelianova, 1999: 3–8; Zelkina, 2000: 66–7).
Thus, the Islamic beliefs of the Kabardinians and Balkars co-existed with
remnants of Christianity, Judaism and paganism. Among important social
and moral regulators, alongside Islam, was Caucasian etiquette, which was
known as the adyghe khabze among the Kabardinians, and as the tau adet
among the Balkars. Its major elements were veneration of elders, respect
for a guest, military valour, humanity, deference, sensibility, bravery,
honour, honesty, decency, loyalty and tolerance (Emelianova, 1999: 17–18;
Gugov, 1999: 62–3; Smith, 1998: 32–6).
Throughout history, the rulers of Kabarda and Balkariya were in conflict
with each other and with other neighbours over land and political influence.
Since the fifteenth century they also experienced regular invasions by the
Ottomans, Crimeans and Iranians. In the mid-sixteenth century the
Kabardin aristocratic families of Dzhambulatov, Cherkasskii, Bekov and
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Kaitukin turned to Russia for protection.5 They were co-opted into the
Russian imperial hierarchy and, alongside Terek Cossacks, often acted as
promoters of Russian influence in the region. In the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries Kabarda and Balkariya, as parts of the Greater Caucasus,
were contested for by Russia, Ottoman Turkey and Iran. Finally Russia
gained the upper hand and the 1774 Kuchuk Kaynardzi treaty legitimized
her supremacy in the region. In the 1860s Kabarda was fully incorporated
within the Russian empire. By the end of the nineteenth century the
Russians had pacified Balkariya, although sporadic outbreaks of resistance
persisted there well into the 1930s (Daniyalov, 1996: 67; Etezov, 2000;
Gugov, 1999: 258; 540–2).
The Cossacks began to settle along the Terek river on the territory of
present-day Kabardino-Balkariya in the seventeenth century.6 They were
ferocious warriors in the service of the Russian tsar, who entrusted them
with the defence of Russia’s southern borders. They lived in militarized
settlements – stanitsas – which functioned on the principles of military
democracy and Orthodox Christian ethics. From the late eighteenth
century the Cossacks made up the bulk of the population of the Russian
fortresses erected along the Terek river, and the strategic route – voenno-
gruzinskaya doroga (military Georgian highway) – built in 1820. Tsarist
ideologists channelled the Cossacks’ deep religiosity into animosity towards
their Muslim neighbours. It is worth noting, however, that despite the
religious differences between the Cossacks on the one hand, and the Kabar-
dinians and Balkars on the other, their relations had never been entirely
antagonistic and included grassroots cooperation and ethnocultural mixing,
unsurprisingly since they shared similar economic and political structures,
social and moral norms, architecture, music and folklore (Barrett, 1999;
Glushenko, 2000: 114; Kipkeyeva, 2002; Landa, 1995: 78–9; Zasedateleva,
1974).
Following the October Revolution of 1917, Kabarda and Balkariya
became parts of the Soviet state. In 1922 the Bolsheviks arbitrarily united
Kabarda and Balkariya into a single administrative unit – the Kabardino-
Balkar Autonomous Region (KBAO) of the Russian Federation. In 1936
its status was upgraded to that of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic (KB ASSR) of the Russian Federation. Following
the mass deportation of Balkars to Central Asia in 1944 the KB ASSR was
transformed into the Kabardin Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
(KASSR). Some Balkar areas were transferred to the jurisdiction of
neighbouring Georgia and North Ossetiya. In 1956, the Balkars were re-
habilitated and allowed to return to their homeland and the Kabardino-
Balkar autonomous republic was restored, albeit within a reduced territory.
During the Soviet period, Kabardino-Balkariya, like the entire country,
underwent a radical socioeconomic and cultural transformation. It
moved from medieval backwardness into a sovietized form of modernity
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acquiring, for the first time in its history, electricity, water supplies, compre-
hensive educational and health care systems, a number of high-tech indus-
tries, mainly of a military nature, large agricultural complexes – kolkhoz
and sovkhoz – and some tourist resorts of national importance. Perhaps the
major achievement was the elimination of the almost total illiteracy of
the population.7 This positive change was, however, overshadowed by the
numerous excesses of totalitarianism, economic opportunism, social,
administrative and ecological engineering and ideological brainwashing. Of
particular social and cultural significance was the massive influx into the
republic of Russians and other Slavs. Additionally, local Muslims suffered
from the official anti-Islamic stance and from the dual alphabetic change
(in the 1920s and 1930s, respectively), which cut them off both from their
literary heritage and from their ethnic and religious brethren abroad.
Another troublesome development was the actual promotion of Kabardin
dominance over the Balkars and Russians who represented the other major
ethnic communities. By the end of the Soviet era, the Kabardinians made
up about 51 percent of the population, while the Cossacks, Russians and
other Slavs constituted over 30 percent, and the Balkars nearly 10.6 percent
(Akkieva and Dumanov, 2001: 71).
The linguistic situation changed dramatically under the Soviets.
Kabardin and Balkar languages were downgraded to use only in the private
sphere, while Russian became dominant in official and educational spheres.
From 1972 Russian was the only medium of instruction in higher education
and in grades 1–10 in national schools, while Kabardin and Balkar were
taught as individual, optional subjects. Similarly, the mass media were over-
whelmingly in Russian with just a few television and radio broadcasts and
periodicals in titular languages, and even then in Cyrillic script. Given the
republic’s linguistic diversity, Russian became the lingua franca. On the
whole, as in other non-Russian parts of the USSR, the majority of Kabar-
dinians, Balkars and representatives of other ethnic minorities became bi-
or even trilingual, although the Cossacks, Russians and other Slavs
remained predominantly monolingual (Akiner, 1983: 195, 228).
THE POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST AND RELIGIOUS
RESURGENCE
The impact of perestroika
The Communist leaders of Kabardino-Balkariya, unlike their counterparts
in Chechnya and Tatarstan, met the Gorbachevian perestroika of the
late 1980s with caution and suspicion. One reason was the republic’s
high dependency on federal subsidies. The other was Moscow’s political
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guarantee for the existing sociopolitical system, which presented a peculiar
synthesis between Communist party and Soviet institutions and traditional
mechanisms of power and resource distribution. The break-up of that
system, as well as the disintegration of the Soviet centralized economy, were
therefore disastrous for the republic. Among its most socially devastating
consequences were the paralysis of military-industrial plants, which had
ensured employment for the bulk of the population, the rapid impoverish-
ment and displacement of the latter and the rise in crime and other illegal
activities, including arms sales, drugs trafficking and hostage-taking for
ransom. An aggravating factor was the proximity of semi-independent
Chechnya, which accounted for the continuous influx to the republic of
Chechen refugees and the proliferation of terrorism and various forms of
extremism (Anchabadze and Perepelkin, 2001).
During the ‘parade of sovereignties’, the republican leadership under
Valerii Kokov8 refrained from any abrupt actions which might compromise
their loyalty to the Kremlin had the old order been restored. Only on 30
January 1991 – that is much later than in many of Russia’s other autonomies
– did the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Kabardino-Balkariya adopt a
declaration of sovereignty and upgrade the republic’s status to that of
‘union republic’. In the context of Moscow’s actual indifference to the
republic and the entire region, the Kokov government faced a growing
democratic and ethnonationalist opposition. Following the abortive coup
d’état in Moscow in August 1991, the opposition leaders organized a series
of anti-government meetings and hunger strikes in front of the Parliament
building in Nal’chik. They accused the republic’s leadership of a secret
alliance with the putschists and called for Kokov’s immediate resignation
and the dissolution of Parliament. It is significant that during this period the
Kabardin and Balkar nationalists acted together within the wider political
opposition movement Democratic Kabardino-Balkariya (DKB).
At the end of August 1991, Kokov, his deputies, prime-minister and a
number of ministers, were forced to resign. In an attempt to retain political
supremacy, Kokov and his close associates opted for the introduction of the
post of President of the republic. In December 1991, Kokov initiated the
formation of the movement ‘For unitary Kabardino-Balkariya’, which was
central in securing his victory during the presidential election in January
1992 (Akkieva, 2002: 35). However, until the autumn of 1992, Kokov’s
authority remained fragile and the republic was on the brink of disintegra-
tion into separate Balkar, Kabardin and Russian parts.
Kabardin nationalism
The first Kabardin national educational and cultural organizations emerged
in the late 1980s. Most noticeable among them was Ashamas, an Adygh
cultural organization, created in 1986 by a group of Kabardin intellectuals
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under the leadership of Zaur Naloyev. Its programme included the revival
of the Kabardin language and culture, the re-evaluation of Kabardin history
and Kabardin involvement in the Caucasian war, in particular, and the
repatriation of the descendants of the Adygh muhajirin (the Kabardinians,
Cherkess and Adyghei) from abroad, especially from Turkey, to their
historic homeland in the North Caucasus. From the late 1980s the issue of
Adygh repatriation had been central in the Kabardin national debate.
Members of the Ashamas and other Kabardin national organizations
established links with their Adygh brethren in more than fifty countries,
especially in Turkey, the Middle East, Europe and the USA (Kushkhabiyev,
1997: 194).
In October 1990, Kabardin national activists convened the first congress
of the Adyghe khase (Adygh council), dedicated to the revival of the Adygh
culture and language and the repatriation of the Adyghs. However,
according to some informants, its hidden agenda included the ethnopolitical
consolidation of the Adyghs of the North Caucasus and the diaspora, and
the creation of the federation of Greater Cherkessiya on the territory from
Shapsuga on the Black Sea to the El’brus mountains, which corresponded
to the Adygh-populated regions of Krasnodarskii krai, Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya and Kabardino-Balkariya. The goals of the Adyghe khase were
shared by the Kongress Kabardinskogo naroda (Congress of Kabardin
people, hereafter referred to as the KKN), which was formed in 1991, the
Kabardin women’s organization Sataney, and some other smaller Kabardin
national organizations.
In Nal’chik in May 1991 the Kabardin nationalists organized the first
world Cherkess congress in which Adygh delegates from the North
Caucasus and abroad participated. The congress established the Mezh-
dunarodnaiya Cherkesskaiya assotsiatsiya (the International Cherkess
association, hereafter referred to as the MCA) as the supreme governing
body of the regional Adyghe khases from both the North Caucasus and the
diaspora. The delegates adopted the charter and programme, which
described the MCA as a non-political public organization dedicated to the
revival and preservation of the Adygh language, culture, traditions and
customs. Its first president became Yurii Kalmykov, deputy of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR. The MCA began to publish the newspaper Nart and
the journal Cherkesskii mir (the Circassian world), both simultaneously in
Russian, English and Turkish.9 Despite their declared non-political charac-
ter, the MCA, as the Adyghe khase, indirectly pursued some political goals,
such as those related to Adygh repatriation and the Greater Cherkessiya
project. It is significant that the Kabardin nationalists, in comparison to
their Balkar counterparts, sought international publicity for their cause.
Among their first moves in this direction was their appeal to the United
Nations to recognize the Adyghs as ‘a people-victim of Russian repression
for the last two centuries’ (Akbashev, 2001b; Borov et al., 2000: 110).
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In its early stage the Kabardin national movement had relatively
harmonious relations with the authorities. Kokov’s government was
sympathetic to the goals of the Kabardin nationalists whom they regarded
as natural allies against the rising Balkar nationalism and as an effective
leverage in dealing with the weakened federal centre. Initially Kokov
followed the example of his Tatar counterpart Mintimir Shaimiev, who
manipulated the Tatar nationalist movement in order to gain considerable
concessions from Moscow (Yemelianova, 2000). The authorities thus
responded positively to the Kabardin nationalist demands regarding
Adygh repatriation, the revival of the Adygh language and the official
recognition of the Adyghs’ suffering during the Caucasian war. In August
1990 the Supreme Soviet of the republic passed a decree establishing the
Remembrance Day of 21 May for the Adygh victims of the Caucasian war
and their subsequent forced deportation abroad. In October 1990 in
Nal’chik, the Kokov government organized and sponsored a conference on
the 19th-century national-liberation struggle of peoples of the North
Caucasus and the problem of muhajirin. The conference’s resolution called
for revision of the official Russian and Soviet historiography of the
Caucasian war and recognition of the Tsarist policy towards the Adyghs as
genocide. In accordance with the conference’s recommendations, the
authorities undertook measures towards facilitating the immigration to
Kabardino-Balkariya of over 2000 Adygh repatriates, most of whom were
from Syria and Kosovo. Officially Nal’chik also turned a blind eye on such
acts of Adygh solidarity as the involvement of over 1500 Kabardinians in
the Abkhaz secessionist movement against Georgia (Kushkhabiyev, 2001).
During the turbulent years of 1991–92 relative harmony in the relations
between Kokov’s government and the Kabardin national movement began
to crumble. The nationalists became more assertive and critical of the
government’s alleged indecisiveness towards Balkar separatism and the
slowing down in the realization of Kabardin national aspirations. In April
1991 these criticisms were voiced at the national conference of the
Kabardin people. The conference denounced the decisions of the first
Balkar congress on Balkar sovereignty. In the aftermath of the abortive
anti-Gorbachev coup d’état in August 1991 Kabardin radicals accused the
republic’s leadership of a secret alliance with the putchists and of indiffer-
ence towards Adygh national interests, and called for Kokov’s replacement
by a more nationalistic Kabardin leader. In August–September 1991, they
participated in anti-government demonstrations organized by the DKB. In
September 1991, in order to defuse the situation, Valerii Kokov introduced
the post of president, which would allow the Kabardinians to institutional-
ize their political domination. This measure secured Kokov the backing of
most of the Kabardin nationalists while the Kabardin radical minority, as
well as the majority of Balkars and Russians, remained in opposition to him
(Dokshokov, 1998: 145).
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Having won the presidential elections, Kokov strengthened his alliance
with the Kabardin moderate majority and distanced himself from the hard
liners. In order to further undermine the radicals he incorporated into
official policy some of their programme demands, such as the strengthen-
ing of pan-Adygh ties, dual citizenship for the Adygh mahajirin, multi-
lateral relations with those countries with considerable Adygh minorities,
and the establishment of the Adygh international academy of sciences. In
1997 Valerii Kokov presided over the creation of the Mezh-parlamenskii
sovet (the Inter-parliamentary council, hereafter referred to as the MPS),
which united the parliaments of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya and Adygheya along pan-Adygh lines. The proclaimed aim of
the MPS was the gradual unification of the legislatures and closer political
and economic collaboration between the three republics.10 In May 2001 the
Parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR) passed a decree ‘On
repatriation of the Adyghs’, which granted Adygh expatriates, mainly from
Turkey, Jordan and Syria, the legal right to return and settle in the KBR.11
The government also called upon historians to rewrite the history of
Kabarda, to produce the world Circassian encyclopaedia, to generate a
single name for the Kabardinians, Cherkess and Adyghei and to create a
unified Adygh alphabet.
On the other side, the authorities intensified the political and adminis-
trative suppression of national radicals. In May 1992, the Supreme Soviet
adopted a decree ‘On social formations’, prohibiting the activity of those
organizations which sought to topple the existing constitutional regime,
or threatened the territorial integrity of the republic and the Russian
Federation as a whole. In October 1992 the Parliament passed a decree
‘On the congress of Kabardin people’, which qualified the KKN as ‘an
anti-constitutional organization’ (Kabardino-Balkarskaiya Pravda, 1992,
11 October). The KKN’s activists were put under police surveillance and
subjected to various forms of persecution. Parallel to the crackdown on
Kabardin and Balkar nationalists, Valerii Kokov promoted his own image
as a President of all peoples of Kabardino-Balkariya, irrespective of their
ethnic origins, and the guarantor of the territorial integrity of the republic.
By the end of 1992 Kabardin radical nationalists were marginalized.
Subsequently, many of them were co-opted into the political and economic
establishment, while the irreconcilable Kabardin minority remained critical
of the Kokov government for its alleged betrayal of the Kabardin cause.
In 1998 the Kabardin radicals were further weakened as a result of the
emigration of their leader Valerii Khetazhukov to Moscow. In 1999 the
Kokov leadership promoted Muhamed Khafitse, the Editor-in-Chief of
the newspaper Adyghe psal’e, as the new tkhamada (leader) of the increas-
ingly pro-government organization Adyghe khase.
As for the International Cherkess association, the authorities embarked
upon a policy of its gradual de-politicization and ‘etatization’. Most of its
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non-political goals were appropriated by the political establishment. Some
of the MCA’s activists were invited into the government structures, while
its radical leaders were gradually sidelined. By the end of the 1990s the
MCA’s activity and rhetoric were hardly distinguishable from the official
line. This evolution was reflected in the decisions of the four successive
congresses of the MCA in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000.12 The fifth congress,
which took place in Nal’chik in July 2000, elected Zaurbi Nakhushev, a
high-ranking Kabardin official, as its new president, replacing the less
obedient Boris Akbashev. The congress modified the MCA’s charter by
dropping any political demands and stressing its purely cultural orientation.
It adopted a new programme outlining the MCA’s goals for the period
between 2000 and 2003.
Balkar nationalism
In 1985 a number of Balkar intellectuals and university students, under the
leadership of Bagauddin Etezov, a journalist of the state radio, founded the
Balkar cultural organization Nag’ysh (village assembly). Soon, its activity
transcended the cultural context and acquired a political character, an
important impetus for which was the Supreme Soviet’s declarations on the
restoration of the rights of repressed peoples, adopted in November 1989.
Acting on this the Nag’ysh appealed to the authorities to establish
Kabardino-Balkar parity in all administrative spheres, as decreed in 1922,
and to restore the Balkar administrative-territorial districts, which existed
before the deportations of Balkars in 1944. In May 1991 the Balkar
demands were partially satisfied: the parliament issued a decree ‘On the
rehabilitation of the repressed peoples’ which contained a programme of
practical measures towards the restoration of the violated rights of Balkars,
including their right to return to the territories lost in 1944.
Alongside the Nag’ysh there emerged a number of other Balkar organiz-
ations all of which united into one Balkar organization – the Tere – under
Etezov’s leadership. At that stage the Tere claimed to have over 32,000
members (Etezov, 2000). The key demands of the Tere, supported by the
Balkar parliamentary deputies, were the restoration of Balkar autonomy
on the territory of the present-day El’brusskii and Cherekskii (Sovetskii)
raions which existed in the early 1920s within the borders of Kabardino-
Balkariya; equal job opportunities for Kabardinians and Balkars; compre-
hensive material and financial compensation for the hardships incurred by
the Balkars during the deportation; and Moscow’s official recognition and
apology for the Cherek massacre of 1,500 Balkar men, women and children
by the ‘execution squads’ of Lavrentii Beriya in the summer of 1942 (Ustav
i programma ‘Tere’, 1990: 2; Akbashev, 2001a).
The lack of response from the federal and republican authorities
prompted the Balkar nationalists into more radical measures. On 19 August
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1990 they organized a Balkar national conference which issued a resolution
on the state sovereignty of Balkariya. In March 1991 the Balkar national-
ists convened the first stage of the first congress of Balkar people, which
was to continue its work until 1996, adopting a programme of Balkar
socioeconomic and territorial rehabilitation. In November 1991 the Tere’s
leaders organized the second stage of the first congress of the Balkar
people, which elected the Natsional’nyi soviet balkarskogo naroda (the
National council of the Balkar people, hereafter referred to as the NSBN)
under the leadership of Boris Chabdarov. The NSBN adopted a declaration
of national independence of the Balkar people which envisaged the
secession of Balkariya from Kabardino-Balkariya and the formation of a
separate Balkar autonomous republic within the Russian Federation
(Kabardino-Balkarskaiya Pravda, 1991). In December 1991 the NSBN
organized a referendum on the national independence of Balkariya, in
which 85 percent of the republic’s Balkar population took part. 94.8 percent
of them supported Balkar independence (Yaz’kova, 2000: 47).
A vital element of the NSBN’s success was its appeal to the injured
ethnic feelings of the Balkars. However, the Balkar national leadership did
not capitalize on this popular vote of trust. Instead it became divided over
tactics and relations with Kokov’s government. Some of the Balkar activists
back-pedalled in fear of repercussions by the authorities. Meanwhile
President Kokov declared the results of the referendum invalid and applied
a ‘divide and rule’ policy towards the Balkar nationalists. Thus, during the
period between 1995 and 1998, the authorities secured payment by the
federal centre of compensation to every Balkar family that had endured
deportation. In 1994 the Parliament of the republic restored the El’brusskii
raion and returned the original name of ‘Cherekskii’ to the Balkar-
populated Sovetskii raion.
Also, the Kokov leadership co-opted some of the Balkar opposition
activists into the political establishment. Among those who moved from
opposition into political office were, for example, Georgii Cherkesov
(Prime Minister from 1992 till 1997), Huseiyn Chechenov (Prime Minister
since 1997) and Il’as Bechelov (Chairman of the Parliament’s chamber of
representatives). By the end of 1992 these official policies had brought the
predictable results: the Balkar national movement was substantially
weakened and ceased to present a viable political alternative to the ruling
regime. This was reflected in the NSBN’s dropping of its original demand
for Balkar sovereignty and its support for President Kokov’s line on
preserving the territorial integrity of the republic.
In the mid-1990s, in conditions of deepening economic crisis, the NSBN
undertook an attempt to regain the political initiative. In November 1996
it convened the next, fourth stage of the first congress of the Balkar people
which returned to the initial demand for the formation of a sovereign
Balkar republic on the territory of El’brusskii and Cherekskii raions.
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However, this decision was purely symbolic, given the decline in the
NSBN’s popularity and political credentials. The authorities declared the
congress’s resolutions illegitimate and began a crackdown on the organ-
izers. The Tere’s activity was suspended; its leaders were put under police
surveillance; and its main office was taken over by the department of the
Interior (Etezov, 2000). Furthermore, in 1996 the authorities managed to
forge a deal with Sufyan Beppayev, who in exchange for a seat in the Parlia-
ment and other privileges, agreed to substantially moderate the Balkar
political demands. In 1999 he headed a parallel pro-government Balkar
national organization Malkar awazi (Voice of Balkariya).
Further depoliticization of the Balkar national movement occurred in
October 2000 when the authorities orchestrated the merger between the
Malkar Awazi and the interregional Karachai organization Alan (as
Karachais and Balkars call themselves) into a unified Balkar-Karachai
organization, also called Alan, under the joint leadership of Sufyan
Beppayev and Ahmet Katchiyev. Alan pledged its loyalty to the Kokov
government and declared its intention to focus its activity on the socio-
economic and cultural problems of Balkars and Karachais. Since then, the
newspaper Malkar Awazi has been a mouthpiece of Alan (Malkar Awazi,
2000). Bagauddin Etezov, Rasul Dzhappuyev and other Balkar national-
ist hard liners distanced themselves from Alan and accused Sufyan
Beppayev of betrayal of Balkar national interests (Etezov, 2001; Bottayev,
2000).
Russian and Cossack nationalism
The disintegration of the Soviet centralized state, and Moscow’s de facto
withdrawal from its ethnically non-Russian periphery, was particularly
painful for the Russians and Cossacks who constituted the second largest
ethnic group. Alongside the general socioeconomic hardships, they suffered
from the psychological shock of being transformed overnight from the
dominant ethnic community, safeguarded by the Russian-based polity and
society, into an ethnic minority. In the late 1980s, in conditions of continu-
ous Russian cultural decline in the region, Cossack and Russian activists
formed a number of Russian cultural and educational organizations. The
most articulate among them was a Russian cultural and historical society
called Veche (assembly) which emerged in Nal’chik. In 1990 a group of
Veche’s members created two more Russian organizations – the Rossiyane
(Rus people) and the Slaviyane (Slavs). The activity of the Rossiyane was
limited to Nal’chik, while the Slaviyane claimed to represent the Russians
of the entire republic. Unlike Veche, the programmes of both organizations
included some political issues, such as the protection of Russians from
political, juridical and social discrimination by the Kabardin-dominated
establishment.13
ETHNICITIES 5(1)62
63
In August 1992, yet another Russian organization – the Russkoyazychnyi
Kongress (Russian-speaking Congress, hereafter referred to as the RK) –
was formed, claiming to represent the Russian-speaking population of the
towns of Prokhladnyi and Maiskii. The first leader of the RK was Viktor
Protasov. At the heart of the RK’s agenda were the issues of preservation
of the territorial integrity of Kabardino-Balkariya and constitutional
change towards recognition of the Russians, alongside the Kabardinians
and Balkars, as a titular ethnic group (Ustav Dvizheniya ‘Russkoyazychnyi
Kongres’, 1992). The leaders of the RK also envisaged it as a counter-
balance to the Kabardin and Balkar national organizations and indicated
their readiness in extreme circumstances to similarly press for the secession
of the Russian-populated areas and their incorporation within the neigh-
bouring Stavropol’skii krai (province).
Parallel to these organizations uniting Cossacks, Russians and other
Slavs, there also emerged purely Cossack organizations. In August 1990,
Cossacks of the stanitsa Kotliarevskaiya created Tersko-malkinskii otdel
terskogo kazachestva (Terek-Malkin department of the Terek Cossacks,
hereafter referred to as the TMOTK), which represented the Cossack
communities from the towns of Prokhladnyi and Maiskii and the statitsas of
Kotliarevskaiya, Soldatskaiya, Ekaterinogradskaiya, Alexandrovskaiya
and Priblizhnaiya of Prokhladnenskii raion.14 The first ataman (leader) of
the TMOTK was Mikhail Klevtsov; its headquarters was in Prokhladnyi.
The TMOTK was concerned with the restoration of the traditional Cossack
lifestyle, including their communal farming, horse riding, rituals, dances
and singing, as well as the revival of the special role of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the Cossack community. Of considerable significance
was the TMOTK’s campaign for the comprehensive rehabilitation of the
Terek Cossacks, the reinstitution of their property rights15 and the official
recognition of the Cossacks as a particular sub-ethnic group of the Russian
people. Alongside the TMOTK emerged a Cossack women’s organization
Beregini (Caring Sisters) which was concerned with the particular problems
of Cossack women and children.
In terms of political orientation, the Cossacks stressed their adherence
to the principle of the territorial integrity of Kabardino-Balkariya.
However, in 1991, like the RK, the Cossack atamans seriously talked about
the possibility of the establishment of a separate Terek republic on the
territory of Prokhladnenskii and Maiskii raions. There was also discussion
about the restoration of the major function of the Cossacks as defenders of
the southern borders of Russia (Klevtsov, 2001; Pevnev, 2001). At that time
there were signs of a growing rapprochement between the RK and the
TMOTK, as well as a drawing towards them of smaller ethnic groups, such
as the Jews, Koreans and Germans. In the event of their consolidation they
could have presented a serious challenge to the Kokov government.
However, the development of this scenario was averted by President
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Kokov’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics. In particular, during his negotiations with
ataman Klevtsov in January 1992, President Kokov guaranteed the terri-
torial integrity and the civic equality of all peoples of the KBR, including
Russians and Cossacks (Klevtsov, 2001). In return, Klevtsov undertook to
withhold most of the Cossack political demands. Since the mid-1990s the
TMOTK and the RK have been in decline. Their activity has increasingly
borne more of a rhetorical than practical character. They have preferred to
complain rather than to act against the political and economic advance of
Kabardinians and Balkars on their traditional positions. Additionally, the
clerics of the Russian Orthodox church, who historically played an import-
ant ideological and spiritual role among the Cossacks and Russians, have
also been inactive and incapable of providing a framework for a Russian
ethnocultural revival. As a result, in spite of their resentment, the Russians
and Cossacks have not prevented the ‘Kabardinization’ and to a lesser
extent ‘Balkarization’ of the administration, even in the solidly Russian
regions of the republic. In Maiskii raion, where Cossacks and Russians
constitute 95 percent of the population, all top managerial jobs have been
occupied by Kabardinians. Among the passive forms of protest by the
Russians and Cossacks has been their emigration to the neighbouring
Stavropol’skii and Krasnodarskii krais and Rostovskaiya oblast.
On the whole, the national movement of the Russians and Cossacks, who
constitute the second largest ethnic group after the Kabardinians, has been
relatively passive. The prevailing feelings among them have been those of
frustration and bewilderment due to a sudden deterioration in their social
status and socioeconomic conditions, and to Moscow’s indifference to their
needs in the face of rising Kabardin and Balkar nationalisms. Compared to
the Balkars and Kabardinians, the Russians and Cossacks have failed to
organize a viable political movement in order to defend and assert their
national interests. Most of the TMOTK and RK’s ambitious goals have
remained on paper and the actual impact of these organizations on the life
of the Russian/Cossack community has been marginal. It could be argued
that the main reasons for this have been an inertia grounded in their
misplaced belief in Moscow’s eventual interference on their behalf, along
with the absence of clan-based social networks which have been crucial in
the national mobilization of Balkars and Kabardinians. In addition, there
is the lack of political and material support from ethnic Russian appa-
ratchiks and businessmen (Klevtsova, 2001).
Religious resurgence
Compared to Dagestan and Chechnya, the Islamic factor has not played a
direct role in the politics of Kabardino-Balkariya. Nevertheless, since the
late 1980s the republic has experienced an Islamic renaissance which has
been characteristic of most Muslim-populated regions of the former USSR.
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There has been a steady growth in the number of mosques, schools and
Islamic publications. Following the disintegration in 1989 of the Dukhovnoe
upravlenie musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza (the Spiritual board of Muslims
of the North Caucasus) there emerged the Dukhovnoe upravlenie
musul’man Kabardino-Balkarii (the Spiritual board of Muslims of
Kabardino-Balkariya, hereafter referred to as the DUMKB) which began
to publish its newspaper Golos religii (Voice of religion) in the Kabardin
language and to conduct a weekly educational programme on Islam on
republican TV and radio in Russian, Kabardin and Balkar. Until 2002 the
DUMKB was headed by muftii Shafig Pshikachev (an ethnic Kabardinian).
By the end of the 1990s there were 145 Islamic communities under the
DUMKB’s jurisdiction, compared to 30 communities in 1990; 138 imams,
10 rais-imams (chief imams), and over 60 primary Islamic schools
(Kuchmezov, 2003; Pshikachev, 2003). During the period 1994–2000, and
since 2003, an Islamic institute in Nal’chik has been operating offering a
five-year period of education. Its director has been Sharafuddin Chuchayev,
an ethnic Balkar. During the initial period most of its lecturers were from
Islamic colleges in Syria, Jordan and Turkey (Atmurzayev, 2000). At
present the institute’s staff consists of 11 lecturers, all of whom are natives
of the KBR. The institute aims at recruiting between 15 and 20 applicants
every year, though so far it has produced only 25 graduates. Between 1991
and 2002 there was a medresse (Islamic secondary school) in the town of
Baksan named after Adam Dymov. Until 2001 there was also a network of
primary Islamic schools and all-year Islamic courses (Babich and
Yarlykapov, 2003: 18–19).
The Islamic construction and publishing boom has produced some
qualitative changes in the local ummah (Islamic community). There has
been a steady growth in mosque attendance, observance of fasting and
other pillars of Islam, and a rise of interest in Islamic education among
Muslim youth. For example, in the mid-1990s, daily attendance at the newly
opened mosque in Nal’chik varied between eight and ten elderly people.
By 2000 it had risen to over 50 people, most of whom were aged 15 to 35.
It is not unusual now to see in mosques children as young as 5 (Babich
and Yarlykapov, 2003: 5–6; Mal’bakhova, 2000). This Islamic revival has
been largely spontaneous, occurring with very little involvement by the
DUMKB, the local muftiyat (mufti’s office), which has been strongly depen-
dent on the authorities and has been unable so far to represent the grass-
roots Muslims and to provide them with much-needed material and
administrative assistance, as well as spiritual guidance. Its members, with
very few exceptions, have been characterized by low professional standards
and a high level of corruption and nepotism (Muhammad-efendi, 2001).
The muftiyat has failed to organize the training of Muslim clerics, either
abroad or at home. Out of 100 local young men who were sent by the
muftiyat to study abroad only seven actually acquired professional
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qualifications and returned home. At present the demand for qualified
Muslim clerics is satisfied only by one-third. Only 10 percent out of the
existing clerics have some sort of Islamic education, while the rest are self-
taught and semi-illiterate elderly imams. They do not know Arabic and base
their prayers on memorized khutba (prayer) and suras (chapters of the
Koran). They are incapable of theological debate and can deal only with
the ritual side of the Islamic faith. They represent so-called popular,
or traditional Islam, which is a peculiar amalgamation of Islam, adat
(customary norms), pagan and early Christian beliefs, the Caucasian ethical
code and Soviet-era practices. It is quite common to discover that these
imams combine their religious duties with heavy drinking, which is prohib-
ited in Islam. Ordinary Muslims have deplored the muftiyat’s unconditional
support for the authorities’ tough policy on genuine and imagined Islamic
extremism as a result of which many innocent Muslims have suffered
(Atmurzayev, 2000; Kuchmezov, 2003).
The combination of continuously dire socioeconomic conditions, the
ineffectiveness of the government, and the inadequacy of the muftiyat, has
provided fertile soil for various forms of non-official Islam, largely of a
fundamentalist nature.16 Compared to official Muslim clerics, the repre-
sentatives of non-official Islam, widely known as Wahhabis, salafis or novye
musul’mane (new Muslims), have been prepared to address the key social
problems.17 Islamic fundamentalist ideas have been generated both within
local society and imported from abroad. Among its local ideologists have
been, for example, Rasul Kudayev, Anzor Astemirov, Musa Mukozhev and
Ruslan Nakhushev. Foreign Islamic fundamentalism has been represented
by the ideas of Ibn Taimiya, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Abul Alaa
Maududi, Sayid al-Kutb and at-Turabi, and proliferated in the republic in
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, brought there by local hajjees (pilgrims
to Mecca and Medina) and foreign missionaries and teachers from a
number of official and non-official Islamic organizations, funds and
colleges. Some of those organizations and funds opened their branches in
Nal’chik and other cities of the KBR. Among the latter were an Islamic
computer centre Minaret, an international Islamic organization Islamic
relief, and the OUE’s bookshop Islamskie tovary (Islamic goods), which
specializes in Islamic fundamentalist literature (Atmurzayev, 2000;
Bottayev, 2000; Yarlykapov, 1999).
It is difficult to assess the scope and intensity of the actual Islamic funda-
mentalist movement in the republic due to the lack of agreed and accurate
criteria for the definition of Wahhabism and the degree of politicization of
the issue. There is no doubt, however, that it has been considerably weaker
than in neighbouring Dagestan or Chechnya. Nevertheless, the local
Wahhabis have displayed some similarities with their Dagestani and
Chechen counterparts, although on a smaller scale. Thus, they have been
largely represented by those young men, both Kabardinians and Balkars,
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who have been frustrated with the continuous economic and social
disorder, the proliferation of crime, alcoholism and drug abuse, as well as
the overwhelming corruption of the ruling regime. They have accordingly
seen in Islam a potent ideology for the social and spiritual revival of the
people. In doctrinal terms they have adhered to salafi Islam and regarded
the existing Islamic practices and the mode and language of prayers as
deviations from true Islam.
New Muslims have focused their activity on the Islamic education of
Kabardinians and Balkars, which they regard as an essential condition for
the gradual re-Islamicization of society. Compared to the Islamic radicals
in Chechnya and Dagestan, they have perceived a direct political engage-
ment as inappropriate in Kabardino-Balkariya, given its political and
cultural integration within Russia, its low level of religiosity and its multi-
confessional demographic composition (Astemirov, 2003; Kudayev, 2003).
In 1993, new Muslims under the leadership of Musa Mukozhev organized
the Islamic Centre of Kabardino-Balkariya (later the Islamic Institute). Its
declared goals included the promotion among the wider public of knowl-
edge of Islam, shariat and Islamic moral norms and values, which are
incompatible with the growing alcohol production sponsored by the ruling
elite. Of particular significance was new Muslims’ criticism of the archaic
clan- and ethnicity-based stratification of the local society and their
ambition to replace it by an inclusive Islamic identity. It is significant that
new Muslims have been the most potent agents of trans-clan and trans-
national solidarity so far. They particularly targeted young people of 10–14
years old. Among their recruitment successes were students of a number of
sports schools in the town of Tyrnauz. Before the schools were closed by
the authorities in 1998, the students had become increasingly critical of the
ruling elite for its anti-Islamic policies of enhancing alcohol production and
consumption in the republic (Ahmedov, 2000; Astemirov, 2003; Severnyi
Kavkaz, 2000a; Zhamborov, 2000).
The new Muslims have criticized the old imams for their distortions of
Islam and Islamic practices. In particular, they have opposed the existing
practice of israf (wastefulness) in the main events of the life circle,
especially funerals, which have a devastating impact on the bulk of the
poverty-stricken population.18 Also, compared to the old imams who used
to memorize Arabic without understanding it, the new Muslims have begun
to conduct prayers in Kabardin and Balkar, which enabled them to explain
the meaning of the Koran to their parishioners. Most old imams have
resisted these innovations, which they regard as manifestations of
Wahhabism and a threat to the traditional Islam that they allegedly repre-
sent (Atmurzayev, 2000). Interestingly, the new Muslims deny the existence
of any intrinsic conflict between themselves and Islamic traditionalists
and argue in favour of constructive dialogue and cooperation between old
and new imams. They insist that the existing split in the local ummah is
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deliberately created by the authorities and Islamic officialdom for their own
political ends (Dzhappuyev, 2003; Kudayev, 2003).
Alongside the moderate majority, there have been a few Islamic activists
who have been closely linked to Chechen and Dagestani Islamic radicals
and international Islamist centres.19 Some of them were trained in the
Islamist camps in Serzhen-Yurt, Achkhoi-Martan and Urus-Martan in
Chechnya; the others in similar camps in Pakistan and in Afghanistan under
the Taliban. In 1996 a group of Islamic radicals, under the leadership of
Imam Kazdokhov, organized an anti-government demonstration with
Islamic slogans. They called for the resignation of the Kokov government
and the formation of a more Islam-friendly and less corrupt administration
and muftiyat. Their religious demands included a return to the initial
purity of Islam through the cleansing of so-called traditional Islam from
paganism and other non-Islamic accretions. The authorities dealt harshly
with the campaigners: some were arrested, others put under close police
surveillance. In 1997 imam Kazdokhov died in mysterious circumstances.
Limited Islamist activity was reported in Hasanya and in El’brus under the
leadership of Atabiyev and Bekkayev respectively. Since the late 1990s
Islamic radicals have either gone deeply underground, or have fled the
republic. It is symptomatic that two out of eight Russian detainees at the
American base at Guantanamo are from Kabardino-Balkariya (Gazeta
Yuga, 2002).
In the autumn of 1999 the authorities of the KBR began a crackdown on
actual and imagined Islamists. This policy reflected the toughening of
Moscow’s position on Islamic extremism and international terrorism.
Following the beginning of the second Chechen war in September 1999, the
Kokov government expressed unambiguous solidarity with President
Putin’s stance on Chechen separatists and their Islamist allies (Gekkiyev,
2000). It has undertaken a series of harsh measures against indigenous and
foreign Islamic organizations. The Interior Ministry identified alleged
Wahhabi enclaves in Nal’chik, Baksanskii and El’bruskii raions. Local
Wahhabis were routinely depicted as criminals and terrorists who had been
trained by the Chechen rebels and subsidized by western intelligence
(‘Mechet’ vam ne gostinitsa’, 2000; Severnyi Kavkaz, 2000a; Tsagoyev,
2001). The authorities closed down the Islamic Centre, as well as mosque
schools affiliated to it. Most foreign Muslim missionaries were deported;
most offices of foreign Islamic funds and organizations were closed. The
links between local Muslims and their co-religionists abroad were severed.
In 2000 the Parliament of the KBR adopted a new restrictive law on
religious communities. In 2001 this law was reinforced by the Parliament’s
decree ‘On extremism’, which in 2002 was overridden by the federal decree
‘On fighting extremist activities’. These provided a legal base for suppres-
sion of religious, or any other, opposition to the regime. As in Soviet times,
the local FSB (the former KGB) has begun to compile lists of active and
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passive Wahhabis, as well as Wahhabi sympathisers. In 2002 the FSB had
registered over 300 Wahhabis (Shashev, 2003).
The pro-government mass media have played a central role in reinforc-
ing the anti-Wahhabi and anti-Islamic hysteria. Thus, the daily newspaper
Severnyi Kavkaz has specialized in ‘exposing’ Wahhabis in the republic and
all over the North Caucasus, and their alleged links with international
Islamic extremist centres based in Turkey, the UAE and Syria. In particu-
lar, the newspaper pointed to the links between local Wahhabis and foreign
Islamists (Bitokova, 2001; Dadievich, 2001; Urazaeva, 2000). The ongoing
war on Islamic extremism has frustrated the local ummah and intensified
its alienation from the regime. Ordinary Muslims have complained about
their fear of being accused of Wahhabism on the basis of their going to
mosque, wearing a beard in the case of men, or a head scarf in the case of
women, or even driving a luxury car (Ahmedov). This, together with the
continuing extreme poverty of the bulk of the population and the breath-
taking enrichment of the ruling elite have created a fertile soil for the popular
reception of Islamicized forms of social protest among local Muslims.
REGIME-FORMATION AND THE CLANS
By the mid-1990s, Valerii Kokov and his entourage had created an ethno-
cratic authoritarian regime beneath the democratic facade. In social terms,
it represented the old Soviet nomenklatura, co-opted members of the oppo-
sition and representatives of semi-criminal business. Publicly, the republic’s
leaders have emphasized their adherence to the principles of the free
market economy, civil society and political democracy. They have praised
themselves for their alleged achievements in creating steady economic
growth, social stability and interethnic harmony. In particular, they have
promoted the image of a just and equal ethnic participation at all levels of
the republican administration and advertise Kabardino-Balkariya as a
unique example of a successful democratic accommodation of the interests
of various ethnic groups. They point to the Constitution (1997), which holds
that the major ethnic groups are proportionally represented in the Parlia-
ment. The President of the republic is a Kabardinian, the Prime Minister is
a Balkar and the Vice-President is a Russian. One chamber of the Parlia-
ment is headed by a Kabardinian, and the other by a Balkar. The Kabardin,
Balkar and Russian languages have the status of state languages (Akkieva
and Dumanov, 2001; Gekkiyev, 2000).
The reality, however, has been quite different from this image, which is
designed mainly for external consumption. As elsewhere in the former
USSR, the stabilization of the ruling regime has occurred against the
background of the pervasive economic and social degradation of the
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republic. Despite the official statistics, the republic has remained one of the
poorest in post-Soviet Russia. Over 50 percent of its population are below
the official poverty line in Russia. The republic’s military industry, which in
the past employed the bulk of specialists and skilled workers, is in ruins.
Similarly, previously flourishing kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been
destroyed, and agricultural production and the number of cattle have
reduced many fold.
The cumulative economic outcome of the 12 years of Kokov’s reign has
been industrial paralysis, a predominance of the black and grey markets
related to oil transportation and refining, alcohol and drugs production and
financial fraud. This has been accompanied by the emergence of a stratum
of ultra-rich ‘new Kabardinians and Balkars’. Nal’chik and its outskirts
have witnessed the construction of luxurious multi-storied villas belonging
to the ruling family, the government and raion administration function-
aries, whose official incomes could hardly cover their basic needs. This
discrepancy has been one of the obvious sources of discontent among the
public who tend to perceive the existing government as little more than a
sanctuary for indigenous criminal groups. Among the social consequences
of the economic disintegration have been the marginalization and pauper-
ization of the majority of the population and its moral degradation, includ-
ing the proliferation of crime, prostitution, drugs and alcohol abuse. The
republic has been overwhelmed by the contract killing of politicians,
businessmen and the leaders of various opposition organizations (Fadeyev,
2002; Klevtsov, 2001).
Despite the democratic façade, the authority of Parliament has been
merely symbolic: it has simply rubber-stamped the decisions taken by the
ruling elite. The authorities have consistently suppressed and neutralized
any viable opposition. The local mass media have been put under strict
censorship. The actual political and economic power in the republic has
been monopolized by a few Kabardin and Balkar clans, the most powerful
of which is the clan of the president. Valerii Kokov enjoys enormous power
which could be compared to that of a medieval despot. During the presi-
dential elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002, Kokov was the only real de facto
candidate in spite of the formal participation in the elections of several
other candidates. The election results were known long before their actual
date (Tkhapsoyev, 2002; ‘Zachem stol’ko shuma?’, 2002). Professionalism
and competence have been superseded by personal loyalty to the president,
while nepotism and cronyism have became a norm of local politics.
The republic’s bureaucratic apparatus has been expanded in order to
accommodate the president’s relatives and friends. The regime’s stability
has been secured by the inflated police and FSB services. The republic has
been overcrowded with police and surveillance troops. This has contributed
to the proliferation among the population of the culture of mutual distrust
and surveillance.
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At the top of the Kokov clan are President Kokov and his relatives who
constitute the ruling semiya (family). Members of the semiya occupy many
of the central and most lucrative positions in the republic’s economy,
administration, legal and power structures. It is widely believed that
Violetta Kokova, the President’s wife, is the richest person in the republic
and holds the republic’s purse strings. Allegedly, she owns a network of
petrol stations, which deal in contraband Chechen oil, as well as a number
of markets and shops (Laipanov, 2000). The republic’s central political
figure, after the President himself, is yet another semiya member, Khauti
Sokhrokov, a Vice-Prime Minister in charge of education and science who
in reality is more powerful than the actual Prime Minister Huseyn
Chechenov. Sokhrokov is related to Violetta Kokova: both came from the
same Urvanskii raion. The republic’s grey cardinal is Marat Akhokhov, the
Minister of Agriculture, and a patrimonial cousin of the President. Kokov,
his wife, Khauti Sokhrokov and Marat Akhokhov decide the major cadre
issues in the republican establishment. Among other influential figures are
Ruslan Giyatov, chief of the republican customs services, whose daughter
is married to one of President Kokov’s sons; Khasan Betuganov, the Deputy
Minister of Interior and a close relative of the President via his wife; and
Yurii Tchagazitov, the Culture Minister who is married to the President’s
niece. The President’s younger brother heads the government’s Hunting
Department, which is instrumental in accommodating important visitors
from Moscow. The President’s sister is Director of the Zaiukovskii hospital
in Baksanskii raion, the best in the republic. The President’s nephew Aslan
Kokov is Director of the prestigious recreation complex in Nal’chik, which
is currently affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior and during the Soviet
period belonged to the central committee of the Communist Party.
The other politically and economically important Kabardin clans are the
Shogenovs, Kushkhovs and Kharayevs. The members of the Kokov clan
and of these three other clans are closely linked with each other and often
intermarry. Together they control the Parliament’s council of the republic;
the Ministries of the Interior, Agriculture, Transport, Press, Information
and Mass Media, Education and Science, Culture, Trade and Health; the
Public Prosecutor’s Office; and the government’s Customs and Tax
Departments. Of particular influence is Khachim Shogenov, the Minister of
the Interior. Among their other representatives are, for example,
Khazratali Berdov, the present Mayor of Nal’chik and Anas Pshikachev,
the head of the DUM KBR. They also prevail in the republic’s most profit-
able businesses such as the production of alcohol and mineral water, petrol
stations and city’s public markets.
Following the Soviet tradition, the ruling Kabardin elite has tolerated the
limited participation of ethnic Balkars in all governing bodies, albeit in
second and third ranking roles. As mentioned earlier, a new influx of
Balkars into administration occurred during the political crisis in 1991–92
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when the Kokov leadership co-opted a considerable number of activists of
the Balkar national movement, as well as representatives of the largest
Balkar clans. The most powerful among them have been the Chechenovs,
the Babayevs and the Zumakulovs. The leader of the Chechenov clan is
Huseyn Chechenov, the Prime Minister. Members of these clans, like their
Kabardinian counterparts, are often linked with each other through
marriage. For example, a daughter of the leader of the Zumakulov clan is
married to a member of the Babayev clan. Representatives of those three
clans hold the posts of Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Parliament’s
council of representatives, the head of the constitutional court, the Minister
of Economy, the Minister of Labour and Employment, the Minister of
Justice and the Chairman of the government’s committee for forestry.
Despite the carefully engineered ethnic and clan division of spheres of
influence, the relations between the Kabardin and Balkar clans have not
been entirely free of problems. There has been a subdued resentment by
the Balkars at their secondary positions. Therefore the semiya has been
especially cautious in choosing the ‘right’ Balkar colleagues and has
groomed them in advance. It has also introduced the practice of regular
rotation of the Balkar apparatchiks in order to prevent them from creating
their own power network similar to that among the Kabardinians. In those
cases where some Balkar appointees have shown excessive initiative and
independence, the semiya have taken measures aimed at their isolation and
eventual replacement by more ‘suitable’ candidates. Among such critically
minded officials were, for example, Muhammed Tsykapov (the Minister of
Economics until 1997) and Zaur Gekkiyev (the Minister of Tourism until
2003).
The resurfacing of clan networks has been accompanied by growing
competition and rivalry, both between and within the Kabardin and Balkar
clans, over political influence and economic resources. The lengthy domi-
nance of the Kokov clan and its associates has antagonized those Kabardin
and Balkar clans whose economic strength has not been matched by
appropriate political status. Among the Kabardins the most politically
assertive have been the Kharayevs. Their recognized leader is Felix
Kharayev, the general director of the Institute of business of Kabardino-
Balkariya. Since the early 1990s the Kharayevs, who during the Soviet
period were more powerful than the Kokovs, have been pressing for a
radical political reshuffle in their interests. In 1991–92 they headed the
Kabardin nationalist opposition to Valerii Kokov. Despite their defeat, they
have remained the most serious opponents to Kokov within Kabardin
circles. From the Balkar side, the Kokovs’ dominance has been challenged
by the earlier mentioned clan of Babayev, which is widely regarded as the
most criminalized clan in the republic.
The actual supremacy of clan ties over modern forms of social cohesion
has triggered the process of legitimization of the clan system and enhanced
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the artificial clan formation among unrelated Kabardin and Balkar bearers
of the same surnames. In 2000 the republican Ministry of Justice introduced
an official registration of clans. It described them as viable and adequate
social formations which were well suited to promote the interests of its
members, and if needed, to provide them with material and moral support
(Severnyi Kavkaz, 2000b). It is plausible to suggest that, if the circumstances
change, these clans could be easily transformed into political units serving
the interests of their powerful representatives. The ongoing ‘re-clanization’
of the local society has further disadvantaged the Russians, Cossacks and
other ethnic groups who have not had clan networks and therefore have
been increasingly isolated and consequently outmanoeuvred by their
Kabardin and Balkar counterparts.
The political and economic prevalence of the Kabardin clans has enabled
the Kokov leadership to promote Kabardin ‘nationalizing’ nationalism
(Brubaker, 1996: 5). As noted earlier, the key elements of this process have
been Kabardin control over the key posts, including that of the President,
their institutionalized involvement in the pan-Adygh activity and pro-
Kabardin historicization (Spencer and Wallman, 2002: 74). Local and
Moscow-based historians have been encouraged to explore the historical
leadership of Kabarda in the region, its ‘unique’ centuries-long special
relations with Moscow compared to Balkariya and other territories of the
North Caucasus and the particular heroism and bravery of the Adyghs
(Kabardinians) during the 19th-century Caucasian war. Significantly, the
sufferings of the Adyghs during that war have been given stronger emphasis
than the hardships of the Balkars during the deportations in the 1940s
(Gugov, 1999; Kasumov and Kasumov, 1992; Kumykov, 1994; Kushhabiyev,
1997). As under the Soviet regime, historical research has been given
priority over contemporary studies. The latter has been largely of a legal-
istic, non-political and descriptive nature (Babich, 1999; Borov et al., 2000;
Dyshekova, 1997). The censored mass media have been similarly instru-
mental in the promotion of the official version of the republic’s history and
present. Its central themes have been Kabardino-Balkariya as an oasis of
stability and interethnic peace, and a bastion against advancing Islamic
fundamentalism in this conflict-ridden and turbulent region. It is also
symptomatic that official periodicals have attached an ethnic dimension to
Islamic fundamentalism, linking it mainly to the Balkars and Chechens
(Urazaeva, 2000).
The stability of the current regime has been linked to its relations with
Moscow. The Kremlin’s political backing has been vital for the continuity
of Kokov’s reign, particularly given the scale of opposition to it. Apart
from that, federal subsidies have constituted a major source of enrichment
for the ruling elite. Thus Nal’chik has carefully attuned its policies and
rhetoric to the liking of the masters of the Kremlin. Following the advent
in 2000 of Vladimir Putin as the new and strong Russian leader, President
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Kokov was quick in establishing close relations with him. Kokov did not
wait, like his counterpart in Tatarstan Mintimir Shaimiev, when the
Kremlin began dismantling the Yeltsin-era assymetrical relations between
the centre and periphery. Instead, he expressed enthusiastic support for
Putin’s centralization project and welcomed the inclusion of Kabardino-
Balkariya in the southern federal district under Victor Kazantsev. In June
2000 President Kokov authorized the creation of a special commission
under the general prosecutor Yurii Ketov in order to overcome the
existing discrepancies between the republican and federal legislatures. At
the beginning of 2001 Kokov issued a decree on the ‘Introduction of
changes into the constitution and legislature of the KBR’, which implied
the adjustment of 25 republican laws to correspond to federal legislature
(Gazeta Yuga, 2001).
As already mentioned, the Kokov leadership reacted promptly to
Moscow’s tougher stance on Chechnya and Islamic extremism by unleash-
ing a similar administrative, political and propaganda crackdown on local
‘Islamic extremists and international terrorists’. In November 1999, in
Nal’chik, President Kokov in his address to the international conference on
‘Islam – religion of peace’ denounced Wahhabism as a totalitarian sect
incompatible with Russian society and the mentality of Russian Muslims
(Kabardino-Balkarskaiya Pravda, 1999, 2 November). The ruling regime
has organized a series of widely publicized criminal proceedings against
local Wahhabis. At the centre of the persecutions have been new Muslims
and representatives of local branches of foreign Islamic organizations such
as the Hizb-Allah, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Islamic Relief and the computer-
linguistic centre Minaret. The authorities have also closed the Islamic insti-
tute, the central mosques and some other Islamic organizations which had
very little to do with Wahhabism. In September and October 2003 the
authorities unleashed a new crackdown on Islamic radicals by closing down
dozens of mosques and arresting over a hundred new Muslims (Kudayev,
2003).
During President Putin’s visit to Kabardino-Balkariya in September
2001 Kokov further strengthened their personal relations, enabling him to
raise his regional rating and outplay his traditional regional rival – the
North Ossetian leader Alexander Dzasokhov. Since then, Moscow has
persistently regarded President Kokov as one of the most reliable conduc-
tors of its regional policy, outdone only by the Dagestani leader
Magomedali Magomedov. In March 2001 President Putin appointed
Valerii Kokov to the newly created state council presidium, which consists
of seven members. The corollary of Kokov’s elevated status has been a
substantial increase in federal subsidies to the republic and the Kremlin’s
unambiguous support for his re-election for a third term in office in
January 2002.
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CONCLUSION
Russia’s autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkariya presents an inter-
esting case study of post-Soviet societal transition, due to its specific
ethnocultural and historical characteristics, formed by the interplay of
Caucasian, Islamic and Russian cultural influences. Of particular signifi-
cance for its contemporary condition has been its Soviet legacy, which
included ethnosocial and administrative engineering, especially the political
unification of the two ethnically different peoples, the Kabardinians and the
Balkars; partial industrialization; atheization; Stalinist purges and deporta-
tion of the Balkars. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Kabardino-
Balkariya, like most of the post-Communist world, experienced the rise of
ethnic and religious nationalism in the conditions of Moscow’s de facto
withdrawal from the region. Compared to the leaders of Tatarstan and
Chechnya, which represent two other interesting cases of post-Soviet
transition, Valerii Kokov, the ex-Soviet leader of Kabardino-Balkariya,
acting upon his instinct of self-preservation, took a cautious stance in his
relations with the Kremlin. In the face of rising Kabardin, Balkar and
Russian nationalist opposition, as well as Islamic resurgence he chose not
to challenge the weakened federal centre by focusing instead on rebuilding
his power base within the republic. Kokov’s compliance with Moscow
acquired a new momentum following the ascendance in 2000 of President
Putin as a new and strong Russian ruler. Since then Kokov has skilfully
attuned the republic’s official policies and rhetoric to the Kremlin’s liking
and anticipated goals. Thus, he was among the first regional leaders who
responded promptly and positively to Putin’s state recentralization project
and tough line on Islamic extremism. The central theme of Kokov’s
rhetoric, designed for both external and internal public consumption, has
been his self-presentation as the guarantor of political stability and inter-
ethnic peace in the politically volatile region. However, the less advertised
side of the ‘stability’ under President Kokov has been social disintegration,
economic stagnation and political stalemate. The republic has experienced
pervasive corruption and nepotism, moral degradation, the rise of crime
and ethno-religious tension. A similar discrepancy between the projected
image and the actual situation has characterized Kokov’s nation-building
project. Thus, he has formally promoted the consociational model of state
formation within a polyethnic society (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993) and
subscribed to the principles of parliamentary democracy. In reality, he has
hampered the democratic process and channelled the republic’s political
life along traditional, primordial vectors. This has been achieved through
the reactivation of the traditional pre-Soviet forms of political and societal
coherence, albeit disguised under modern institutional camouflage, and
their fusion with the Soviet-era state law-enforcement and surveillance
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networks. As a result, Kokov has formed an ethnocratic regime represent-
ing a few powerful clans under the leadership of his own family. The
regime’s stability has been maintained through a crackdown on any potent
opposition, a skilful manipulation and placating of ethnic and religious
nationalisms and a suppression of the free press, as well as any independent
academic research into the republic’s current situation. The ruling elite has
safeguarded the supremacy of the Kabardin clans by indirectly promoting
the Kabardin ‘nationalizing nationalism’ in all major spheres of life. It could
be argued that the ongoing re-traditionalization and primordialization of
the local polity and society represents a historic regression from the Soviet
version of civic nationalism to the clan- and region-based particularism of
the Middle Ages. The case of Kabardino-Balkariya does not fit smoothly
into the dominant concepts of post-Communist nation-building which
downplay primordialism as ‘a long-dead horse’ of the postmodern world
(Brubaker, 1996: 8, 15). On the contrary, it reveals the persistence and even
pivotal role played in post-Communist national mobilization by prim-
ordialist networks.
Notes
1 There are about 15 million Muslims in the Russian Federation, belonging to
over 40 ethnic groups. The major Muslim enclaves are situated in the North
Caucasus and the Volga-Urals. For further details, see Yemelianova, 2002.
2 The territory of Kabardino-Balkariya does not exceed 12,500 square km,
which makes up less than 0.1 percent of the territory of the Russian Feder-
ation. Its population is 0.784 million, out of Russia’s total population of 142
million. The urban population makes up 60 percent and the rural population
40 percent. The republic is divided into eight administrative raions (districts),
seven cities and towns and seven urban-type settlements. Its capital is
Nal’chik, which has a population of 239,000. Among the republic’s few natural
resources are deposits of molybdenum-tungsten ore (in Tyrnauz), complex
ores, gold, facing stones (granite, diabase, marble and tuff) and other building
materials. It is one of the least economically developed republics of Russia, its
economy is ranked 72nd in Russia in per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
(in 1995). Its industry, which in the Soviet period consisted of a number of
defence-related plants, machine-building factories producing electrical engi-
neering articles and instruments, wood-working machine-tools, cables, tractor
trailers and automatic machinery, has been in decline. The republic is strongly
dependent on federal subsidies. There is some viable local agriculture
represented by the farming of grain (wheat, barley, corn), fodder grass, vegeta-
bles and sunflower and by dairy and beef cattle-breeding, horse-breeding, and
sheep-breeding.
3 This article is based on the findings of a Leverhulme Trust-funded project ‘Ethnic
Politics and Islam in the western North Caucasus’ (2000–03). The research
focuses on the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya
and Adygheya. Its main methods are media analysis and elite interviewing.
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4 Alongside the Kabardinians, the Abkhaz-Adygh ethnolinguistic group also
includes the Cherkess and Abazins of neighbouring Karachaevo-Cherkessiya,
Temigoevtsy and Shapsugs of Adygheya, and Abkhaz of Abkhazia (in neigh-
boring Georgia), as well as the Abadzekh, Ubukh, Bzhadugh and Nabukhai
who are dispersed over the western North Caucasus.
5 Here the author uses a Russified version of Kabardin and Balkar surnames in
accordance with the Russian historiographical tradition. In the past most
records were made by Russian officials who Russified the Kabardin and Balkar
surnames. It is worth noting, however, that in those documents which were
issued in the Nogai area, which in some periods was controlled by the Crimean
khan, the Kabardin and Balkar surnames appeared in a Turkicized form and
were written in Arabic script.
6 Cossacks’ identity is a controversial issue. Some specialists regard them as a
distinctive sub-ethnic group within the Russian ethnic community, while others
describe them as military estate among Russians. In terms of geographical
location the Cossacks are divided into the Urals Cossacks, the Dniepr Cossacks,
the Don Cossacks, the Kuban Cossacks and the Terek Cossaks (Glushenko,
2000: 7).
7 In 1926 only 6.8 per cent of Kabardinians, and 5.3 percent of Balkars could read
and write; in 1970 over 99 percent of Kabardinians and Balkars were literate
(Akiner, 1983: 194, 228)
8 Valerii Muhammedovich Kokov, a Kabardinian, was born in 1941 in Tyrnauz.
He is a typical Soviet apparatchik who rose from the bottom to the very top of
the Soviet/Party nomenklatura (literally ‘nomenclature’, but in Russian this has
the negative connotation of a ‘bureaucratic class’). In 1990 he became the first
secretary of the republican obkom (regional committee) of the Communist
party.
9 The MCA’s leadership believed the use of these three languages would enable
them to convey their message to the majority of Adyghs worldwide (via Russian
to Russia’s Adyghs; via Turkish to Turkey’s Adyghs; and via English to the
Adyghs in the Middle East, Europe and the USA).
10 The MPS consisted of 27 parliamentary deputies, nine from each republic. The
MPS functioned until 1999 when its activity was paralyzed as a result of the
election of Vladimir Semenov (half Karachai and half Russian) as a new
President of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya.
11 Altogether by the end of 2002 over one thousand Adygh repatriates from
Turkey, Syria, Jordan, the USA, former Yugoslavia and Holland were residing
in the KBR (Gazeta Yuga, 2002).
12 The second congress of the MCA took place in Maikop (Adygheya). It re-
elected Yurii Kalmykov as the president of the MCA and elected Boris
Akbashev, a professor and a parliament deputy of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya as
the Vice-President of the MCA. The third congress of the MCA was convened
in 1996 in Cherkessk (Karachaevo-Cherkessiya). It re-elected Kalmykov and
Akbashev as the MCA’s President and Vice-President, respectively. Following
the death of Kalmykov in January 1997, Boris Akbashev took over as president
of the MCA. The fourth congress of the MCA, which was held in 1998 in
Krasnodar, elected Akbashev as its President. It decided to move the MCA’s
headquarters from Nal’chik to Cherkessk. The fifth congress of the MCA took
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place in Nal’chik. It elected Zaurbi Nakhushev, the Chairman of the Chamber
of the Parliament of Kabardino-Balkariya as new president of the MCA and
Boris Akbashev as Vice-President.
13 Between 1991 and 1996 Slaviyane, under the leadership of Fedor Bezgod’ko,
organized a series of localized protests against the Parliament’s declaration of
sovereignty of the republic; the introduction of the post of the president; the
actual elections of president; the resolutions of the Kabardin and Balkar
congresses; the 1994 migration bill and some other government decisions which
encroached upon the rights of the Russian and Cossack population. (Sourced
from the personal archive of Fedor Bezgod’ko.)
14 The TMOTK was a constituent part of the political movement Terskoe
Kazach’e Voisko (Terek Cossack troops) and of the federal movement Soyuz
Kazakov Rossii (Union of Cossacks of Russia). Interestingly, the TMOTK was
not included in the Reestr terskogo kazach’ego voiska ( State registration of the
military formation of the Terek Cossacks) which treats the Cossacks as a
soslovie (an estate) rather than a sub-ethnic group (Pevnev, 2001).
15 The Cossacks argued that the legitimacy of their ownership rights to the vast
land situated along the voenno-gruzinskaiya doroga (military-Georgian
highway) in the northern Kabardino-Balkariya derived from the purchase of
that land by the Russian Crown from the Kabardin noble family of Kadzokhov
(Klevtsov, 2001; Severnyi Kavkaz, 1999)
16 Here the term fundamentalism defines a reaction of believers against those
influences which they perceive as a threat to their spiritual and political self-
realization, according to their faith. In the case of Islam the fundamentalist
movement is a desire to return to what is believed to be the pure, unadulter-
ated Islam of Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs.
17 In Kabardino-Balkariya, as well as in other Muslim regions of the former Soviet
Union, the terms Wahhabism and salafism describe the local form of Islamic
fundamentalist movements. Here I have kept this terminology despite its in-
adequacies because of its wide acceptance by politicians, journalists and the
general public.
18 According to the local tradition, during the first three days after the burial, the
relatives of a deceased Muslim have to treat his or her friends, and anybody
who happened to pass by, to a meal and to provide them with a food package
containing 1 kg of lamb, 1 kg of sugar, 1 kg of flour and 1 kg of sweets. A similar
procedure is repeated on the 40th and 52nd days after the burial (Akkiev, 2000).
19 Here the term Islamism defines a political movement under Islamic banner.
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